

Message Text

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2581

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TEXT OF LATEST DRAFT GUIDANCE ON LINKAGE
BETWEEN PHASES (FIFTH REVISION)

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LATEST DRAFT GUIDANCE ON LINKAGE BETWEEN
PHASES. REPORT ON MAY 10 SPC TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES OF MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BASIC CONCEPTS

(SAME AS IN ISD/73(2ND REVISE).)

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B. CENTRAL OBJECTIVES

IN THE NEXT MBFR NEGOTIATING SESSION, THE ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE
OF GETTING THE EAST TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATION IN A FIRST

PHASE OF ONLY US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND TO DEFER REDUCTIONS OF OTHER NATO FORCES TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASISE THE COMMON CEILING AS THE BASIS FOR THE OVERALL ALLIED APPROACH AND A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE.

TO ACHIEVE THE FOREGOING OBJECTIVES, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORISED TO PROCEED AS OUTLINED IN SECTIONS

II-V BELOW, IF AND AS JUSTIFIED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION; ALL POINTS WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON REACHING A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING COMMITMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

IN ORALLY INDICATING TO THE EAST THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THESE STEPS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD USE GENERAL LANGUAGE IN DRAWING ON THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW.

WHILE KEEPING IN MIND CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS INSTRUCTION, AND AVOIDING STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH THEM, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD POSTPONE SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS UNTIL ACTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS JUSTIFIES SUCH ACTION. THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD DETERMINE THE TACTICS AND SEQUENCE OF PRESENTATION TO THE EAST OF THE ITEMS BELOW.

II. THE FIXING OF THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES

WITH RESPECT TO PREVIOUS ALLIED INDICATIONS THAT THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHIN AN AGREED FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO

EITHER

(DISCUSS THE SURATION OF THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. DEPENDING UPON THE PROGRESS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD IN DUE COURSE INDICATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS SIGNIFICANT PARIAL WITHDRAWALS HAD BEEN EFFECTED, AND NOT LATER
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THAN AT THE END OF THE TIME AGREED UPON FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS)

OR

(DISCUSS THE DURATION OF THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. DEPENDING UPON THE PROGRESS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD IIN DUE COURSE BE PREPARED TO INDICATE THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN (AS SOON AFTER FIRST PHASE SIGNATURE ASIS PRACTICABLE, BUT IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN AT THE END OF THE TIME AGREED UPON FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS) OR (AS SOON AFTER A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE AS IS PRACTICABLE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT,

BUT NOT LATER THAN 18 MONTHS AFTER THE AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE). IF THE NEGOTIATORS FIND IT NECESSARY IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THEY COULD INDICATE THAT THEIR PRELIMINARY THINKING IS THAT (THESE WITHDRAWALS WOULD NOT TAKE) OR (THIS PERIOD WOULD NOT BE) LONGER THAN 18 MONTHS.)

(FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE AD HOC GROUP ONLY, PERFORMANCE ON THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD BE A FACTOR BOTH IN DETERMINING THE (TIMING) OR (PACE) OF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AND IN INFLUENCING THEIR SATISFACTORY OUTCOME.)

III. NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT

TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS THAT WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT INCREASE THEIR FORCES BETWEEN PHASES TO COMPENSATE FOR US WITHDRAWALS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS, WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS A NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT BINDING THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND APPLYING BETWEEN A FIRST PHASE AND A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT. THE MATERIAL IN PARENTHESES BELOW IS FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF THE AD HOC GROUP ONLY, AND NOT FOR USE WITH THE OTHER

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B. THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD COME INTO FORCE ONLY UPON CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, (IN ACCORDANCE WITH C-M(73)83(FINAL).) INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

C. THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE AS A MEANS OF LINKING THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES. (THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PRE-JUDGE THE FORM OF THE COMMITMENT. IT COULD ASSUME ONE OF SEVERAL FORMS, E.G. A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ITSELF, A JOINT EAST-WEST DECLARATION MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, SEPARATE OF COLLECTIVE DECLARATIONS OF INTENT BY BOTH SIDES MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, OR THE RECORD OF A PLENARY MEETING SHOWING THAT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE WESTERN SIDE AND ONE FOR THE EASTERN SIDE HAD MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS
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AGREEING TO THE COMMITMENT.)

D. THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BECOME INVALID IF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED OR IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF. A SATISFACTORY SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, WHEN CONCLUDED WOULD AUTOMATICALLY SUPERSEDE THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

E. IN ANY EVENT, THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION, THE EXACT PERIOD TO BE FIXED, INTER ALIA, IN THE LIGHT OF THE BEGINNING DATE OF SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS (REFERENCE: SECTION II). (THE MAXIMUM PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED BY MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE TWO SIDES. SUCH MUTUAL CONSENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AND SHOWED REASONABLE PROMISE OF A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.)

F. THE COMMITMENT SHOULD CONTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO ALLOW FOR NORMAL EXERCISE AND ROTATIONS(1). (THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE SO FORMULATED THAT IT WOULD IN NO WAY RESTRICT QUALITATIVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OR OTHERWISE HINDER DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.)

G. (THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE NON-INCREASE OFFER TO THE EASTERN SIDE IS MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN MBFR AGREEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IN NEGOTIATION A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY CAN BE COVERED BY A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.)

IV. ASSURANCES TO OTHER SIDE REGARDING SECOND PHASE(2)

(WHITH REGARD TO EASTERN QUESTIONS WHETHER OTHER ALLIED
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN SECOND PHASE
NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES WOULD , IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY
FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, BE SILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT THAT
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THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS TO THE AGREED
COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES OF EACH SIDE WOULD INCLUDE
REDUCTIONS IN THE FORCES OF ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS.)

OR

(REGARDING WESTERN REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE,
THE ALLIES COULD TELL THE EAST THAT SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS
TO A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE

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- (1) THE EXACT NATURE OF THESE EXCEPTIONS WILL BE THE SUBJECT
OF TECHNICAL STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.)
 - (2) ONE DELEGATION IS AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SECTION.
-

AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, INCLUDE FORCES OF
ALL NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN THE EVENT OF AN OTHERWISE
SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE OF
THE COMMON CEILING, THIS COULD BE MADE CLEAR IN AN APPROPRIATE
STATEMENT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.)

V. (WITHDRAWAL PROVISION)(1) OR (REVIEW PROCEDURE)(1)
(IN ORDER TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS THAT SECOND PHASE
NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT HAVE AN OUTCOME, THE ALLIES , IN THE
CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT INCLUDING
AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE,
WOULD CONSIDER INCLUDING A PROVISION IN THE FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE USSR TO
TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT AFTER A FIXED PERIOD, FOR EXAMPLE FIVE
YEARS, IF A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN CONCLUDED BY
THEN).

OR

(THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY
OF INCLUDING IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT A PROVISION PERMITTING
WITHDRAWAL OF THE USSR AND THE US FROM THE AGREEMENT AFTER FIVE
YEARS, UNLESS A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.)

OR

(THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT COULD CONTAIN A PROVISION
STIPULATING THAT, FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF THE
FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, THE TWO SIDES WOULD CONSIDER THE EXTENT
TO WHICH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SATISFACTORY AND
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EXAMINE THE PROGRESS MADE IN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. THE

PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO DRAW THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS, INCLUDING THAT OF TERMINATION OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT IF A SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN BY THEN AGREED.)

(1) NE DELEGATION ASKED THAT THIS SECTION BE DELETED. IT FELT THAT WITHDRAWAL/REVIEW PROVISIONS SHOULD BE ELABORATED NOT IN THE LINK CONTEXT BUT IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENT IN PARAGRAPH 37 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL) FOR A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

END TEXT.
MCAULIFFE

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